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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State of Idaho timely appealed from the district court's Order on Motion to 
Suppress asserting that the district court erred in finding that Jose Valero's incriminating 
statements were involuntary. Mr. Valero asserts that the district court correctly found 
that his statements to police were involuntary and, thus, gathered in violation of his right 
to due process of law, and the district court properly suppressed those statements. 
Mr. Valero requests that this Court affirm the district court's order granting his motion to 
suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State alleged through a criminal complaint that Jose Valero committed one 
count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, and one count of lewd 
conduct with a child under the age of sixteen, naming 15-year-old L.M. as the alleged 
victim. (R., pp.6-7.) A preliminary hearing was held, Mr. Valero was bound over into 
the district court, and an Information was filed charging him with the above crimes. 
(R., pp.17-21.) 
Mr. Valero filed a Motion to Suppress "evidence unlawfully gathered by law 
enforcement in violation of Defendant's 4th , 5th , 6th Amendments, 14th Amendment and 
Defendant's right to due process." (R., p.36.) Furthermore, Mr. Valero specifically 
alleged in his motion that, 
[d]uring an interview following a polygraph, law enforcement coerced, 
intimidated and caused Defendant to make statements. That coercion 
was of such a manner that it violated Defendant's rights and he was 
unable to make a voluntary and knowing waiver of rights. 
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(R., p.36.) The State filed a written Objection to Motion to Suppress (R., pp.39-47), and 
a hearing was held on Mr. Valero's motion (R., pp.48-50; Tr. 3/17/11). 
The State's first witness was Cy Armstrong, captain of the Fruitland Police 
Department. 1 (Tr. 3/17/11, p.28, L.15 - p.29, L.3.) Captain Armstrong testified that 
Mr. Valero was alleged to have "touched a young lady [who was in his foster care] 
inappropriately." (Tr. 3/17/11, p.29, L.23 - p.30, L.14.) Mr. Valero voluntarily met with 
Captain Armstrong, denied any inappropriate touching during the one and one-half to 
two hour interview, and agreed to take a polygraph - "He actually seemed relieved and 
rather excited about it, and said he would be more than willing to do it." (Tr. 3/17/11, 
p.30, L.15 - p.31, L.18.) The State's next witness was Steven Bartlett, detective with 
the Ada County Sheriff's Office, who testified that he is a polygrapher who has been to 
over ten interview schools in his career, "probably the most well known is the Reid 
school of interview and interrogation techniques," and that he administered a polygraph 
to Mr. Valero. (Tr. 3/17/11, p.35, L.19 - p.44, L.9.) The district court agreed to review 
State's Exhibit A, a DVD containing video and audio of the pre-polygraph interview, the 
polygraph itself, and the post-polygraph interview, after the hearing. (Tr. 3/17/11, p.43, 
L.4 - p.44, L.6.) 
After reviewing the contents of the DVD, the district court issued a preliminary 
Order on Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.51-59.) The district court noted that Mr. Valero 
1 Prior to Captain Armstrong testifying, Mr. Valero called Floyd Skeesuck, Mr. Valero's 
former teacher, to testify about the educational difficulties that Mr. Valero had during his 
school years. (Tr. 3/17/11, p.6, L.6 - p.28, L.12.) The last witness called during the 
hearing was Delores Valero, Mr. Valero's mother, who also testified about Mr. Valero's 
learning difficulties and cognitive deficits. (Tr. 3/17/11, p. 60, L.1 - p. 66, L.12.) The 
district court ultimately found that despite some difficulties such as "comprehending 
complex documents," Mr. Valero "speaks English fluently." (R., pp.53-54.) 
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voluntarily agreed to take the polygraph, was not under arrest and was free to leave, 
and was Mirandized2 , and made the following relevant findings of fact: 
The total length of the questioning was just over 3 hours. The pretest 
interview lasted about 87 minutes. During that time, Bartlett emphasized 
that the reason the polygraph was requested is that Health and Welfare 
was involved and they needed to find out the truth. Bartlett went over the 
allegations, making sure to clarify Defendant's position that he never 
touched the child's breast. Bartlett made statements that included: the 
issues in this case are minor, nothing serious; the minor issues in this 
case are ones that "you and I" can get resolved today'[sic]; the 
accusations are not "big deals" criminally. When referring to accusations 
that [Mr.] Valero fondled the victim's butt, Bartlett stated the accusations 
were even "more minor on the minor scale" and told [Mr.] Valero the 
polygraph would include questions about that. Bartlett then reassured 
[Mr.] Valero that the accusations "were not a big deal and really had no 
bearing on anything except if [Mr.] Valero was being truthful" about the 
incident. 
Later, Bartlett said if you lie about them, Bartlett would testify 
against [Mr.] Valero in a court of law, and the victim does not want to see 
[Mr.] Valero prosecuted. 
The two then moved to a smaller room where Defendant was made 
to sit in a chair with armrests and face into a corner while Bartlett 
remained somewhere behind him, off-screen, asking the polygraph 
questions. 
After the test, the two went back into the interview room. Bartlett 
informed [Mr.] Valero that his responses convinced Bartlett that 
[Mr.] Valero had touched the girl's breast. [Mr.] Valero still denied it. 
Bartlett then stated that he knew [Mr.] Valero must be scared, that Bartlett 
could testify 100% that [Mr.] Valero's hand touched the victim's breast, 
that touching the breast is "not the end of the world, but what is getting 
you toward the end of the world and getting you in a bad spot right now is 
the crime of lying to the police." [Mr.] Valero once again denied it, but 
upon Bartlett's insistence, he agreed that if the polygraph machine said he 
did it, then he did it. Bartlett then suggested themes and [Mr.] Valero 
made specific statements of why he did it. 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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(R., pp.52-53.) The court indicated that it was "inclined to conclude" that Detective 
Bartlett's tactic of telling of Mr. Valero that he could testify to 100% certainty that he lied, 
that the allegations were minor in nature, and that the legal consequences of the crime 
of lying to the police are worse than the consequences of the crimes for which he was 
accused, "was sufficient to overbear [Mr.] Valero's will." (R., p.56.) However, the court 
concluded that "this precise issue was not argued or briefed ... making this as a 
tentative ruling." (R., p.5S.) The court gave the state an opportunity to address the 
issue in order to "meet its burden to demonstrate that the statement was constitutionally 
voluntary" due to the tactics used by Detective Bartlett, "or that if impermissible, it did 
not, under the totality of the circumstances, overbear the defendant's will." (R., p.5S.) 
The State provided a Supplemental Brief in Support of Objection to Motion to 
Suppress and Mr. Valero filed a Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.61-67, 
70-76.) The district court found that the State's additional arguments were unavailing 
and concluded the following: 
In this case, the defendant maintained his denial of criminal 
conduct after being advised that he had failed the polygraph. It was only 
after Bartlett made a statement to the defendant that in effect he would be 
in worse trouble for maintaining the untruthful denial of the crime than if he 
admitted engaging in the conduct which had been represented to be no 
big deal legally. 
Bartlett's representations were clearly linked to the defendant's 
willingness to talk, and that's what overbore the defendant's will. Bartlett's 
message was the defendant was going to be in big trouble unless he 
confessed. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that this is a 
forbidden tactic and that it undermined the defendant's free will. 
Therefore, the Court stands by its earlier ruling and orders that the prior 
order of this Court is the final order which granted the motion to suppress. 
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(Tr. 6/2/11, p.3, L.8 - p.5, L.22.) The district court entered a second Order on Motion to 
Suppress stating that Mr. Valero's "statements were not voluntary under the totality of 
the circumstances due to law enforcement[,]s use of coercion and deceit in obtaining 




Did the district court correctly grant Mr. Valero's motion to suppress as his statements 
were involuntary and obtained in violation of his right to due process of law? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Valero's Motion To Suppress As His 
Statements Were Involuntary And Obtained In Violation Of His Right To Due Process Of 
Law 
A. Introduction 
After Mr. Valero had repeatedly denied any inappropriate touching of L.M., 
before, during, and after the polygraph, Detective Bartlett told Mr. Valero that he could 
testify with 100% certainty that Mr. Valero was lying, and that the "crime of lying to the 
police" was more serious than the crimes of lewd conduct and sexual abuse that he had 
been accused of. Essentially, Detective Bartlett told Mr. Valero that he could prove to 
100% certainty that he had committed a worse crime than the crime that he was alleged 
to have committed, and that the only way to avoid the consequences of the "crime of 
lying to police" was to admit to committing crimes against L.M. The district court 
correctly found, under the totality of the circumstances, that Detective Bartlett's coercion 
overbore Mr. Valero's will and that his inculpatory statements were constitutionally 
involuntary and taken in violation of his right to due process of law. 
B. Relevant Jurisprudence And Standard Of Review 
The United States Supreme Court "has long held that certain interrogation 
techniques, either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular 
suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Miller v. Fenton, 474 
U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (citing Brown v. Mississipi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)). Confessions 
that are secured through constitutionally invalid means are described as "involuntary." 
Id. (citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,207 (1960)). "The doctrine disallowing 
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the use of involuntary confessions ... is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and it applies to any confession that was the product of police 
coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was otherwise obtained by methods 
offensive to due process." State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814-815 (citing Miller, supra; 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,304 (1985); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-
515 (1963)). "[CJoercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the 
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn 361 U.S. 
at 206 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)). The proper inquiry is to 
determine, from the totality of the circumstances, whether the incriminating statements 
were the product of the defendant's will being overborne by police coercion. Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-288 (1991). 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 
559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). The ultimate question of whether a confession was 
involuntary is a legal question subject to de novo review. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287. 
C. Mr. Valero's Inculpatory Statements Were The Product Of Detective Bartlett's 
Coercion And, Thus, Were Involuntary 
Mr. Valero's inculpatory statements were involuntary, as they were the product of 
police coercion. The district court correctly recognized that after repeated denials, 
Mr. Valero's will was overborne by Detective Bartlett telling him that he would testify 
with 100% certainty that he was lying to the police and that the crime of lying to the 
police was more serious than the crimes for which he was being investigated. 
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1. After Being Told By Detective Bartlett That He Could Testify To 100% 
Certainty That Mr. Valero Lied On His Polygraph, And After Being Told 
That The Crime Of "Lying To The Police" Was More Serious Than The 
Crimes He Was Alleged To Have Committed, Mr. Valero Made 
Incriminating Statements 
The district court correctly recognized that during the pre-polygraph interview, 
Detective Bartlett minimized the seriousness of the allegations and told Mr. Valero that if 
he lied about those allegations, he would testify against Mr. Valero. (R., pp.52-53.) 
Detective Bartlett began the pre-polygraph interview by explaining the process to 
Mr. Valero. (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 0:00 - 2:00.) He then told Mr. Valero that it does 
not matter what he previously told the police or health and welfare personnel - "What 
matters today is, when you and I discuss the facts and figures of today's interview, is 
what you tell me truthful?" (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 2:00 - 2:47l Detective Bartlett 
stated that if Mr. Valero is only 99.9% truthful, he will fail the polygraph. (Exh.A. Title 1: 
approx. 5:00 - 5:25.) He then told Mr. Valero that he does not have a "dog in this fight" 
and that he does not work for Mr. Valero, Health and Welfare, the Fruitland Police 
Department, or the prosecutor's office. (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 7:30 - 8:00.) 
Detective Bartlett told Mr. Valero that "polygraphs are admissible in court," 
meaning that they are "able to be used in court ... so the results of this polygraph - the 
police department and the court can bring that out in court.,,4 (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 
3 Quotations from State's Exhibit A are approximate based upon undersigned counsel's 
interpretation of what was said. Additionally, words spoken by Mr. Valero that appeared 
to be said in anticipation of the statements/allegations/accusations Detective Bartlett 
was making or was about to make, were purposefully omitted in this Brief. 
4 This statement is demonstrably false as polygraphs are only admissible in front of a 
jury in the unlikely case of a stipulation by both parties, and they are never admissible to 
vouch for the credibility of a witness. See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 (1989); State v. 
Perry.139 Idaho 520 (2003). However, it is not clear whether Detective Bartlett's 
statements were made out of a desire to deceive Mr. Valero or unjustifiable ignorance of 
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8:25 - 9:05.) Detective Bartlett explained that law enforcement provides a report to the 
prosecutor "who makes the decision of whether they will prosecute you depending upon 
your - their findings, or your truthfulness." (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 10:30-10:50.) 
Detective Bartlett then minimized the allegations against Mr. Valero - describing them 
as "minor touching and issues of insignificant value" - but told him that they have to 
investigate it because health and welfare is involved, and that the most important thing 
is to tell the court that "Jose was truthful." (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 11 :30 - 13:30.) 
Detective Bartlett continued to minimize the allegations by telling Mr. Valero that the 
court system is more concerned with whether he is lying, or whether he is sorry for 
some of the things he has done, and told him that his job was to determine whether 
Mr. Valero was telling the truth and he would give his findings to the court. (Exh.A. Title 
1: approx. 13:30 - 21 :15.) He stated, "if you lie about today's proceedings, no matter if 
it's about the smallest thing that you and I talk about, I will testify against you in a court 
of law." (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 21 :15 - 21 :45.) 
After going over his Miranda rights, explaining that he was free to leave at any 
time, and getting some biographical and contact information, Detective Bartlett began 
asking Mr. Valero about his history with L.M. and the allegations, again stressing that 
they were minor in nature. (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 23:00 - 41:10.) Detective Bartlett 
stated that he would make a list of things that did happen and things that did not happen 
the law. Detective Bartlett testified during the motion to suppress hearing that 
polygraphs are admissible "beyond objection," that he has testified to the "validity, 
reliability of polygraphs before a jury trial," that he was being truthful when he told 
Mr. Valero that he could testify "with 100 percent certainty" whether or not he was telling 
the truth, and that "we use the polygraph in Ada County on a regular basis." 
(Tr. 3/17/11, p.46, L.2 - p.50, L.2.) Although the district court could have easily found 
Detective Bartlett's testimony to be not credible due to well-established legal precedent, 
such a finding was not necessary as the entire polygraph process was caught on video. 
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and that, "it's not a big deal. It has no real bearing on anything except for if you're 
truthful." (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 41: 1 0 - 41 :40.) He then stated that he talked to L.M. 
to get a read on whether she is someone who would make something up to get 
Mr. Valero in trouble, and he stated that he did not believe that L.M was that type of 
person. (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 41:40 -43:00.) Detective Bartlett again stressed that 
the issues were minor and that Mr. Valero may want to write an apology letter. (Exh.A. 
Title 1: approx. 43:00 - 45:00.) 
Over the next thirty-five minutes, Mr. Valero repeatedly denied any of the 
allegations including touching L.M.'s butt, lifting up her shirt and touching her breasts, 
and putting his mouth on her breasts. (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 45:00 - 1 :20:00.) 
Detective Bartlett went over the test procedures and Mr. Valero went into the small 
room where the test would proceed, remarking that the room looked like an execution 
chamber. (Exh.A. Title 1: approx. 1 :07:00 - 1 :30:00.) During the polygraph, Mr. Valero 
was asked nine separate questions about whether he touched L.M.'s breasts and he 
said "no" all nine times. (Exh.A. Title 2.) 
The district court described the post-polygraph interview as follows: 
After the test, the two went back into the interview room. Bartlett informed 
[Mr.] Valero that his responses convinced Bartlett that [Mr.] Valero had 
touched the girl's breast. [Mr.] Valero still denied it. Bartlett then stated 
that he knew [Mr.] Valero must be scared, that Bartlett could testify 100% 
that [Mr.] Valero's hand touched the victim's breast, that touching the 
breast is "not the end of the world, but what is getting you toward the end 
of the world and getting you in a bad spot right now is the crime of lying to 
the police." [Mr.] Valero once again denied it, but upon Bartlett's 
insistence, he agreed that if the polygraph machine said he did it, then he 
did it. Bartlett then suggested themes and [Mr.] Valero made specific 
statements of why he did it. 
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(R., p.53.) Again, the district court's findings are well supported. Detective Bartlett 
started the post-polygraph interview by asking Mr. Valero how he thought he did on the 
test - Mr. Valero responded "good." (Exh.A. Title 3: approx 0:00 - 0:30.) After leaving 
the room and coming back with the purported test results, Detective Bartlett again 
asked Mr. Valero how he thought he did on the test - he again responded "good." 
(Exh.A. Title 3: approx 0:45 - 6:15.) Detective Bartlett then told Mr. Valero he showed 
"significant reactions" when answering the questions regarding touching L.M.'s breasts, 
and further stated, 
The issue of you touching her breasts is the thing in your life that's 
causing you the greatest grief. So, which means one of two things: One, 
you're deliberately choosing to lie to me about touching her breasts. 
Alright? Two, there is some contact - touching of her breasts, that you are 
not being completely forthcoming about with me, but you - I can testify in 
a court of law, right now, that one-hundred percent, your hands touched 
her breasts, under her shirt. 
So here is what has to happen. I want you to listen to me for about 
two seconds here. I understand that you may be nervous about this 
process. I understand that you may be a little bit scared about the entire 
issue. But again, I'm telling you, touching [L.M.]'s breasts, under her shirt, 
is not the end of the world. What is getting you to the end of the world and 
getting you in a bad spot now is the crime of lying to the police. Alright? 
So Jose I know that you touched [L.M.]'s breasts. I know that you 
touched her under her shirt. I don't think that you are some malicious 
person, which is a good thing. Alright? It's a good thing that I go to the 
court and I say, 'Court, I sat in a room and talked to Jose for a couple of 
hours. He's not the kind of person that touched [L.M.]'s breasts because 
he's some huge sexual deviant. You know some guy who's trying to hurt 
her.' Right? You weren't trying to hurt her when you touched her breasts, 
right? 
(Exh.A. Title 3: approx 6:15 - 9:45.) Mr. Valero again stated that never touched L.M.'s 
breasts; in response, Detective Bartlett stated, "well, you did. You did." (Exh.A. Title 3: 
approx 9:45 - 10:00.) 
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Detective Bartlett again accused Mr. Valero of touching L.M.'s breasts and 
continued, "It's not a matter of what you did because we already know what you did. I 
want to explain to the court that you're not this horrible, horrible person. You're not, are 
you?" (Exh.A. Title 3: approx 10:00 - 10:22.) Mr. Valero agreed he was not a horrible 
person. (Exh.A. Title 3: approx 10:23;) Detective Bartlett continued by stating that he 
would have to go to court and say "absolutely, one-hundred percent, that Jose touched 
[L.M.]'s breasts," but he wanted to be able to tell the court that he is not a rapist or a 
molester, and that he was just "curious" or maybe "horny," and that he touched her 
breast because she had been rubbing up against him on prior occasions. (Exh.A. Title 
3: approx 10:24 - 11 :40.) Mr. Valero then said, "that's what happened." (Exh.A. Title 3: 
approx 11 :40 - 12:40.) The interrogation continued with Detective Bartlett repeatedly 
telling Mr. Valero that he had already been shown to be a person who lies to the police 
and Mr. Valero made further incriminating statements. (Exh.A. Title 3: approx 12:40 -
1 :08:00.) 
2. The District Court Correctly Determined That, Under The Totality Of The 
Circumstances, Mr. Valero's Will Was Overborne By Detective Bartlett's 
Coercion; Thus, His Inculpatory Statements Were Involuntary 
The district court correctly reviewed the totality of the circumstances and 
concluded the following: 
In this case, the defendant maintained his denial of criminal 
conduct after being advised that he had failed the polygraph. It was only 
after Bartlett made a statement to the defendant that in effect he would be 
in worse trouble for maintaining the untruthful denial of the crime than if he 
admitted engaging in the conduct which had been represented to be no 
big deal legally. 
Bartlett's representations were clearly linked to the defendant's 
willingness to talk, and that's what overbore the defendant's will. Bartlett's 
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message was the defendant was going to be in big trouble unless he 
confessed. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that this is a 
forbidden tactic and that it undermined the defendant's free will. 
Therefore, the Court stands by its earlier ruling and orders that the prior 
order of this Court is the final order which granted the motion to suppress. 
(Tr. 6/2/11, p.5, LsA-22.) 
The district court's findings and conclusions are well-supported. It is abundantly 
clear that Mr. Valero continued to deny that he had inappropriately touched L.M. 
However, Detective Bartlett claimed that, based upon the polygraph results, he could 
testify, with 100% certainty, that Mr. Valero was lying to the police when he told him that 
he did not touch L.M. - a separate "crime," according to Detective Bartlett, that is more 
serious than the crimes he had been accused of. After again denying he had touched 
L.M. but being told by Detective Bartlett that he could testify to 100% certainty that he 
touched L.M.'s breasts, Mr. Valero agreed that he touched her breasts. Under the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Valero's will was overborne by Detective Bartlett's 
coercion. 
The State asserts that Detective Bartlett's actions were not coercive. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) In making its argument, the State relies in part on Beltz v. 
State, 980 P.2d 474 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999), for the proposition that merely downplaying 
the seriousness of the offense and seeming to befriend the defendant does not make 
the officer's conduct coercive. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) Mr. Valero does not disagree 
with this general proposition. However, the facts of this case are distinguishable from 
the facts of the Beltz case. 
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First, the district court in this case made a factual/legal finding that Mr. Valero's 
will was, in fact, overborne by Detective Bartlett's conduct (R., p.78; Tr. 6/2/11, p.5, 
Ls.4-22), whereas the district court in Beltz found that the defendant's claim that his 
confession was induced by an implicit promise not to prosecute was '''highly suspect' -
that it appeared to her that Beltz had contrived his testimony to satisfy the test for 
involuntariness," a finding the appellate court found was supported by the record. Beltz, 
980 P.2d at 478-479. Second, the alleged coercive conduct in Beltz was limited to 
merely down playing the seriousness of the offense leading the defendant to believe he 
would suffer not consequences. Id. at 478. In contrast, Detective Bartlett's actions 
went beyond merely downplaying the seriousness of the offense. Detective Bartlett did 
not just suggest to Mr. Valero that a judge would go easier on him if he confessed; 
rather, Detective Bartlett explicitly told Mr. Valero that the supposed crime of lying to the 
police was more serious than the alleged crimes of lewd conduct and sexual abuse of a 
minor. (See generally Exh. A.) In essence, Detective Bartlett gave Mr. Valero a choice 
of either admitting to the "minor offenses" of sexual abuse and lewd conduct, or facing 
more severe consequences for committing the "crime of lying to the police." Under the 
totality of the circumstances, Detective Bartlett's conduct went beyond mere implied 
promises of leniency, and was coercive. 
The State also asserts that Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618 
(Nevada 1996), is "instructive." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7 -8.) In Bessey, the defendant, 
accused of engaging in numerous sexual acts against a minor without her consent, 
made inculpatory statements only after a police officer showed him a false crime lab 
report purportedly showing the presence of the defendant's semen on a couch where 
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the acts allegedly occurred. Bessey, 914 P.2d at 619. The Bessey Court recognized 
that while police deception is a relevant factor in determining whether the conduct was 
coercive, "an officer's lie about the strength of the evidence against the defendant is, in 
itself, insufficient to make the confession involuntary." Id. (citing Holland v. McGinnis, 
963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1082 (1993).) Again, 
Mr. Valero does not dispute that this general proposition is a correct statement of the 
law. 
The Bessey Court went on to quote the following portion of Holland v. McGinnis: 
Such misrepresentations, of course, may cause a suspect to confess, but 
causation alone does not constitute coercion; if it did, all confessions 
following interrogations would be involuntary because "it can almost 
always be said that the interrogation caused the confession." Miller v. 
Fenton, 796 F.2d 598,605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 
585, 93 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986). Thus, the issue is not causation, but the 
degree of improper coercion, and in this instance the degree was slight. 
Inflating evidence of Holland's guilt interfered little, if at all, with his "free 
and deliberate choice" of whether to confess, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412,421,106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141,89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), for it did not lead 
him to consider anything beyond his own beliefs regarding his actual guilt 
or innocence, his moral sense of right and wrong, and his judgment 
regarding the likelihood that the police had garnered enough valid 
evidence linking him to the crime. In other words, the deception did not 
interject the type of extrinsic considerations that would overcome 
Holland's will by distorting an otherwise rational choice of whether to 
confess or remain silent. 
Id. at 325-326 (quoting HoI/and, 963 F.2d at 1051) (emphasis added). Citing to a case 
from the Supreme Court of Hawaii, State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 71-74 (Hawaii 
1993), the Bessey court differentiated between "intrinsic" falsehoods - falsehoods 
related to the facts of the alleged crime itself, and "extrinsic" falsehoods - falsehoods 
that would distort the defendant's otherwise rational choice to remain silent, and which 
under Kelekolio are regarded as coercive per se. Bessey, 914 P.2d at 620-621. 
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Intrinsic falsehoods are those related to the allegations themselves, i.e., the existence of 
an eye witness or physical evidence, or the confession of a co-defendant. Id. On the 
other hand, 
Examples of extrinsic falsehoods of a type reasonably likely to procure an 
untrue statement or to influence an accused to make a confession 
regardless of guilt would include the following: assurances of divine 
salvation upon confession, promises of mental health treatment in 
exchange for confession, assurances of more favorable treatment rather 
than incarceration in exchange for confession, misrepresenting the 
consequences of a particular conviction, representation that welfare 
benefits would be withdrawn or children taken away unless there is a 
confession or suggestion of harm or benefit to someone. 
Id. (citing Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Kelekolio, 849 P.2d at 73-74.) 
In the present case, the falsehoods made by Detective Bartlett involved extrinsic, 
not merely intrinsic, considerations. Detective Bartlett did not only tell Mr. Valero that he 
failed the polygraph and that he could testify to 100% certainty that he touched L.M.'s 
breasts - a falsehood that would be considered intrinsic under the Bessey analysis -
Detective Bartlett took his lies one step further by telling Mr. Valero that he could testify 
to 100% certainty that he committed the "crime of lying to the police" - a more serious 
crime than the crimes for which he was being investigated. (See generally Exh.A.) By 
doing so, Mr. Valero could no longer make a rational choice as to whether or not to 
waive his right against self-incrimination. From his perspective, Mr. Valero was facing 
prosecution either for the "crime of lying to the police" or for the crimes of lewd conduct 
and sexual abuse of a minor. Believing that the "crime of lying to the police" was the far 
more serious offense based upon Detective Bartlett's lies, Mr. Valero acquiesced to 
Detective Bartlett's coercion and made incriminating statements regarding the 
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supposedly less serious offense. In sum, the Bessey opinion, relied upon by the State, 
supports the district court's finding that Mr. Valero's confession was involuntary. 
Additionally, the State relies upon State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926 (Ct. App. 
1995), asserting that it is the "most instructive case." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) In Wilson, 
the defendant, accused of having intercourse with his step-daughter, made inculpatory 
statements after being Mirandized and while being transported to jail. Wilson, 126 
Idaho at 927. The defendant filed a motion to suppress claiming that his statements 
were involuntary due to the officer down playing the importance of his Miranda rights, by 
being lulled into a false sense of security by the officer's statements, by the officer 
raising questions about how the incident would affect the defendant's family, and by the 
officer implying leniency it the defendant cooperated.5 Id. at 928-929. Rather than 
being instructive, the Wilson Court merely determined that the district court's findings 
that the statements made by the officer were not sufficient to undermine the defendant's 
will were not clearly erroneous; thus, the statements were voluntary. Id. at 929. The 
Court in no way held that downplaying the seriousness of the charges, stressing the 
harm that might come to a defendant's family, or implied promises of leniency, would 
always be insufficient to undermine the defendant's will under the totality of the 
circumstances. Id. 
The Wilson Court did, however, recognize that, "[i]f the defendant's free will is 
undermined by threats or through direct or implied promises, then a statement cannot 
be considered voluntary and is inadmissible." Id. In the present case, the district court 
5 The defendant also claimed that he was not Mirandized - a factual finding rejected by 
the district court and found to not be clearly erroneous on appeal. Wilson, 126 Idaho at 
928. 
18 
made the factual finding that Mr. Valero's free will was overborne, "after Bartlett made a 
statement to the defendant that in effect he would be in worse trouble for maintaining 
the untruthful denial of the crime than if he admitted engaging in the conduct which had 
been represented to be no big deal legally." (Tr. 6/2/11, p.S, LsA-22.) Thus, although 
the lack of analysis engaged in by the Wilson Court limits how "instructive" the opinion 
truly is, it should be read to support the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in this case. The State's argument is unavailing. 
Additionally, the State claims that the district court failed to apply the totality of 
the circumstances test. (Appellant's Brief, ppA, 9-14.) The State's argument is either 
patently false or misguided.6 The State provides its analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances based upon the factors noted in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218,226 (1973). (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-14.) Those factors include, whether Miranda 
warnings were given, the defendant's age, level of education and intelligence, the length 
of the detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and deprivation 
of food and sleep. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; see also State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 
214 (1993). Indeed, although the Schneckloth Court was dealing specifically with the 
question of what factors should be consider when determining whether consent to 
search was voluntarily given (ld. at 223), the Schneckloth factors have been recognized 
as relevant to the determination of whether a confession was voluntary. See Arizona v. 
6 It appears that the State may have inadvertently failed to review the transcript of the 
June 2, 2011 hearing, in which the district court clearly stated that it found, under the 
totality of the circumstances, that detective Bartlett's conduct undermined Mr. Valero's 
free will. (See generally Appellant's Brief (referencing the district court's written findings 
in its initial Order on Motion to Suppress but containing no citation to the transcript of 
the June 2, 2011 hearing); see also Tr. 6/2/11, p.3, L.8 - p.S, L.22.) Mr. Valero believes 
that the State did not purposefully attempt to mislead this Court. 
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Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 284 (1991); Troy, supra. However, these factors are not the 
only factors to consider as the Schneckloth Court itself recognized that the listed factors 
were only "some of the factors" that had been considered in determining voluntariness 
in the past. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (citations omitted). 
Additionally, a single tactic such as the use or threatened use of violence can be, 
in and of itself, coercive and render a confession involuntary, regardless of the presence 
of other non-coercive factors. See Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). A confession is not admissible merely 
because the defendant is an intelligent, well-fed person, who was out of custody and 
was read his Miranda rights, prior to being beaten by the police. Thus, to the extent that 
the State suggests that this Court should merely look to the Schneckloth factors, make 
a checklist of those weighing in favor of a finding of voluntariness, with those weighing 
in favor of a finding of involuntariness, and leave the determination of whether a 
defendant's right to due process was deprived to a mathematical formula, this Court 
should reject such a suggestion. 
This Court should affirm the district court's order granting Mr. Valero's motion to 
suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Valero respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
granting his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2012~ 
! 
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